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INTRODUCTION:  
Since 1959, Barbie has been an American icon and the queen of the fashion-doll market. 
However, in 2001, Bratz fashion-dolls entered the market, and their funky, chic attitudes became 
“must-haves” for little girls everywhere. Within five years Bratz ballooned into a billion dollar 
global phenomenon, and after sixty years of being the sole force within the doll industry, Barbie 
met its match.
2
 Ironically, the Bratz concept was developed by, now former Mattel employee, 
Carter Bryant.
3
 While Bryant was still employed at Mattel he pitched the Bratz doll idea to MGA 
Entertainment Inc. (MGA), and presented preliminary sketches along with a crude mock-up of 
the doll.
4
 After MGA offered Bryant a consulting agreement to develop the Bratz brand; Bryant 
immediately resigned from Mattel, signed a consulting agreement with MGA Entertainment Inc. 
and began working the Bratz collection.
5
 The drawings Bryant used to pitch the Bratz idea to 




JUDICIAL BACKGROUND:  
In 2004 Mattel filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California (“District Court”) against Carter Bryant for violation of his employment agreement, 
and against Mattel for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets.
7
 In 2008 the 
District Court, awarded Mattel $10 million in damages, imposed a constructive trust transferring 
                                                 
2
 Parija Kavilanz, Bratz are back! Watch out, Barbie, CNN MONEY (June 23, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/22/news/companies/bratz_barbie_dolls_war/index.htm. 
3
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC (RNBx), 2010 WL 3705902 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
2010)(the jury found that Bryant thought of the “Bratz” and “Jade” names, and created the preliminary sketches and 
sculpt, while he was employed by Mattel). 
4
 Id.   
5
 Id.  
6
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter Mattel v. MGA Entm’t]. 
7Mattel v. MGA Entm’t, 616 F.3d at 904. 
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competitor's “Bratz” trademark portfolio to manufacturer, and enjoined future acts of copyright 
infringement. MGA and Bryant appealed.
8
  
MGA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On July 22, 
2010, the Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court decision.
9
 Chief Judge, 
Kozinski, author of the Circuit Court opinion held that:  
(1) The employment agreement did not unambiguously require assignment of 
employee's idea for a new line of fashion dolls; (2) awarding constructive trust 
was abuse of discretion; (3) the employment agreement was ambiguous as to 
whether it covered only works created within the scope of employment, or 
whether it covered works created on employee's own time; and (4) fashion dolls 





After the case was remanded to the District Court, an eight-person jury returned a verdict 
against Mattel on April 21, 2011 finding that Mattel did not own a copyright in the creative 
designs behind the dolls. However, the jury found that Mattel misappropriated twenty-six of 
MGA’s trade secrets and awarded MGA $3.4 million for each misappropriated trade secret for 
an approximate total of $88.5 million.
11
 
 Although, the District Court jury on remand ultimately found Mattel did not own a 
copyright in creative designs behind the Bratz doll’s or conduct the “substantial similarity test” 
directed by the Ninth Circuit, this paper will explore how the Ninth Circuit improperly defined 
the “substantial similarity” test in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t when the court held that substantial 
similarity should be determined from the perspective of the “ordinary observer” and not a child, 
                                                 
8
 Bryant v. Mattel, Inc., CV 04-9049SGLRNBX, 2008 WL 5598275 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).  
9
 Mattel v. MGA Entm’t, 616 F.3d at 904. 
10
 Id.   
11
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-04-09049-DOC-RNB (C.D. Cal. 2011) (available at 
http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/sites/tsi.brooklaw.edu/files/filings/carter-bryant-v-mattel-inc-mattel-inc-v-mga-
entertainment-inc/20110421redacted-jury-verdict-form.pdf.)  
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failing to include within the “intrinsic analysis” the “ intended audience test.” In addressing this 
question the paper will first discuss what a copyright protects. Second, the paper will explain 
how copyright infringement is determined under the substantial similarity tests and review the 
two basic approaches of the Circuit Courts. Third, the development of the substantial similarity 
test in the Ninth Circuit will be outlined. Fourth, the paper will analyze how the “intended 
audience test” has been adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Federal Circuits 
when the works in dispute are intended for specialized audiences. Finally, the paper 
demonstrates how the Ninth Circuit misapplied the substantial similarity test by failing to include 
within the “intrinsic analysis” the “intended audience test,” holding substantial similarity should 
be determined from the perspective of the “ordinary observer,” instead of a child.   
I. WHAT DOES A COPYRIGHT PROTECT? 
A person who obtains a copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102 obtains “a limited duration 
monopoly,” allowing the individual to employ the work without any restrictions and fear it will 
be copied.
12
 Copyright protection covers original works of authorship that have been fixed into a 
tangible form expression.
13
 However, copyright protection never extends to ideas.
14
 A work can 
be copyrighted if it is: “(1) original; (2) an expression of an author; (3) of non-utilitarian nature; 
(4) in a fixed tangible medium of expression.”15   
The purpose of copyright is to protect and generate creativity.
 16
 Copyright law grants the 
author exclusive rights to prevent others from reaping the benefits of the time, money, and effort 
                                                 
12
 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 206 (7
th
 ed. 2009); 33 U.S.C. § 102 
(2006).  
13
 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  
14
 Id.  
15
 MARK LITWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO FINAL CONTRACTS 
300 (3
rd
 ed. 2009).    
16
 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 206 (7
th
 ed. 2009).  
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the she sacrificed to develop her idea. Those rights include the right to: (1) reproduce the work; 
(2) distribute copies of the work; (3) perform the work publicly (4) make a derivative of the 
work; (5) display the work publicly.” 17 Once a person obtains a copyright she has the option of 
assigning away her rights, and charge for the use of their expression.
18
 In conclusion, copyright 
law protects the financial interests and competitive market needed for innovative thinkers to 
develop their ideas into tangible expressions.   
 
II.  THE DETERMINATION OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE 
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST  
 
To establish a successful copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must show ownership 
of a copyright for the work, that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the 
defendant’s work infringes on protected elements of the plaintiffs work.19 The court must apply 
the “substantial similarity test” to determine whether the defendant copied protected elements of 
the plaintiffs work. The essence of the test is whether an ordinary observer would afford the 
alleged violator’s work with the same unique and creative attraction as the original work, in 
effect, diminishing the value of the original work.
20
 This substantial similarity test is approached 
by each Circuit Court differently, yet, each Circuit’s test embodies the same concept.   
The” substantial similarity test” consists of a two-step analysis; the first step employs the 
“extrinsic test” and “intrinsic test,” and the second step  involves “analytic dissection test” and 
“the ordinary observer test.”21  The “extrinsic test” is an objective comparison of specific 
                                                 
17
 Id.    
18
 Id. at 207.  
19
 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 
21, 2010) (citing Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 913 (9th Cir.1987)). 
20
 Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1996). 
21
 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding 
the first prong of the substantial similarity test requires analytic dissection aided by expert testimony to determine 
the substantial similarity of “ideas”) [hereinafter Krofft McDonald’s Corp.]; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 




 The test aids the court in its determination of whether the two works 
“share a similarity of ideas and expression measured by external, objective criteria.”23 
Application of the test requires the court to conduct “analytical dissection of the work at issue 
and expert testimony.”24 During analytical dissection the court filters out the protectable portions 
of the work because Copyright law only protects an author's original tangible expression.
 25
 
Ideas, unoriginal components, and scenes a fair (standards features) are unprotectable under 
copyright law and therefore, unreviewable by the court in its final determination of copyright 
infringement.
26
 However, it is important to recognize that although portions of the work when 
separate are unprotectable, the coordination and arrangement of individually unprotected items 
may be copyrightable.
27
 Therefore, a plaintiff may satisfy the extrinsic test if the court finds the 
combination of those elements sufficiently creative.
28
  
The Circuit Courts have essentially adopted two approaches to the first step of the 
substantial similarity test. The First, Second, Third Circuit follow the Arnstein v. Porter 
approach, where the first step requires the trier of fact to determine through dissection analysis 
and expert testimony, whether the similarities between the works are sufficient enough to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2d Cir. 1946)[hereinafter Arnstein] (holding first the court must conduct analytic dissection to determine whether 
there has been “copying,” and second the court must determine whether the “reasonable observer” would find 
copying was substantial enough to find “unlawful appropriation”).  
22
 Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Cavalier v. 
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002)) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 
1990)).  
23
 Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Swirsky v. 
Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
24
 Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Three Boys 
Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
25
 See, e.g., Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA 
Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010).  
26
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010) 
(citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990); 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2006). 
27
 Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003).  
28
 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002) (for example, in the court held that even though the 
elements common to both plaintiff's screenplay and defendant's television series were not individually 
copyrightable, Metcalf passed the extrinsic test because his combination of unprotectable items was copyrightable). 





  The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit have adopted the “extrinsic 
test” test as the first prong of the substantial similarity test from Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. 30 The “extrinsic test” requires the trier of fact to determine the 
substantial similarity between the works by conducting analytic dissection through comparing 
the works ideas based on specific criteria.
31
 The Ninth Circuit now applies a modified approach 
of the Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. test.32  The difference between these two approaches is when 
the trier of fact determines copying has actually occurred. In Arnstein v. Porter test the 
determination is made under the first prong, in the Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. test the 
determination is reserved for the trier of fact in the second prong.
33
 Once the unprotectable 
elements are removed only the author’s particular expression of the idea is left, which is 
protectable.
34
 Next, the court applies the “intrinsic test” also known as the “reasonable observer 
analysis.”   
                                                 
29
 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (it is worth noting that the result in Arnstein – to reverse 
summary judgment to defendant Cole Porter on Arnstein’s claim that Porter hired “stooges” to follow him around 
and steal his songs – seems crazy. Arnstein was a serial litigant who sued any number of famous musicians alleging 
copying). 
30
 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 858 
(6th Cir. 2003); Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010); Positive Black Talk 
Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 374 (5th Cir. 2004). 
31
 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).  
32
 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 
21, 2010) (explaining that the extrinsic step first starts by determining the breadth of the possible expression of those 
ideas. If there's a wide range of expression, then copyright protection is “broad” and a work will infringe if it's 
“substantially similar” to the copyrighted work. If there's only a narrow range of expression, then copyright 
protection is “thin” and a work must be “virtually identical” to infringe); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As it has evolved, however, the extrinsic test now objectively considers 
whether there are substantial similarities in both ideas and expression, whereas the intrinsic test continues to 
measure expression subjectively. Because only those elements of a work that are protectable and used without the 
author's permission can be compared when it comes to the ultimate question of illicit copying, we use analytic 
dissection to determine the scope of copyright protection before works are considered as a whole”).  
33
 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9
th
 Cir. 1970) (holding that the fundamental question of 
“look and feel” directly to the finder of fact). 
34
 See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 
2010) (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir.1994). 
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The Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the “intrinsic test,” which is 
the subjective prong of the substantial similarity test.
35
  The test requires the court to engage in a 
subjective comparison that focuses on whether the ordinary reasonable audience would find the 
works are substantially similar in “the total concept and feel of the works.”36 The “intrinsic test” 
measures the “substantial similarity in expressions ... depending on the response of the ordinary 
reasonable person.... [I]t does not depend on the type of external criteria and analysis which 
marks the extrinsic test.”37 Unlike the first prong, expert testimony is not considered and 
analytical dissection of the works is not conducted under the “reasonable observer” analysis.38 
The First, Second and Third Circuits in the second prong apply the “ordinary observer” test, 




                                                 
35
 See id.; Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (“under the intrinsic test, a 
court will determine whether, upon proper instruction, a reasonable jury would find that the works are substantially 
similar.” However, unlike the Ninth, Fourth and Sixth Circuit the court has not adopted the “total concept and feel 
language); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the “reasonable observer” 
would find “The Keeper” poem and screenplay and “Little Nicky,” were completely dissimilar in both their overall 
look and feel and in their constituent expressive element).  
36
 See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cavalier v. 
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir.2002). 
37
 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a judicial determination under the intrinsic 
test is now virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has become a mere subjective judgment as to whether 
two literary works are or are not similar). 
38
 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that in the intrinsic 
prong of the Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp two-step substantial similarity analysis, 
analytic dissection and expert testimony are not appropriate).; Concrete Machinery Co., Inc. v. Classic Lawn 
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-09 (1st Cir. 1988); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d. Cir. 1946) (holding the 
trier of fact applies the ordinary observer test, unaided by dissection or expert testimony, to determine whether the 
copying resulted in substantial similarity between the works).  
39
 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d. Cir. 1946) (holding that to determine substantial similarity, first the 
trier of fact must determine whether the defendant copied through analytic dissection and expert testimony, second 
the trier of fact must determine whether copying is sufficient where the ordinary observer would find “unlawful 
appropriation”); Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Second, the plaintiff must establish that the 
copying is actionable by “prov[ing] that the copying of the copyrighted material was so extensive that a ordinary 
observer would find infringement and the copyrighted works ‘substantially similar.”); Universal Athletic Sales Co. 
v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) (“…must be shown that copying went so far as to constitute improper 
appropriation, the test being the response of the ordinary lay person.”).  
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Although, the approaches seem similar in procedure since all three involve first the 
analytic dissection of the works and then the application of the “ordinary observer” test; their 
divergence in the second prong is significant in the determination of copyright infringement. The 
Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. approach only separates out the protectable elements from the works 
in the first prong, relying heavily on the trier of fact in the “ordinary observer” to determine 
whether the “total concept and feel” of the works so substantially similar to find copyright 
infringement.  Whereas, the Arnstein v. Porter approach determines “copying” through analytic 
dissection and expert testimony in the first prong, relying only on the trier of fact to determine 
whether the “ordinary observer” would find that the copying amounted to unlawful 
appropriation.  The delineation in the approaches is critical to the determination of copyright 
infringement, because the Arnsetin v. Porter approach allows expert testimony to aid in the 
determination of “copying,” where the Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. test leaves the decision of 
copying strictly to the trier of fact.
40
 As a result of Krofft v. McDonald’s Corp. test’s’ reliance on 
the trier of fact in determining whether copying has occurred and thus reached the point of 
substantial similarity, courts have worked to narrow the scope of determination.  The Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have recognized that the “reasonable observer” standard is not 
sufficient to determine the substantial similarity and have required the trier of fact in certain 
cases to find whether the works at issue would be found substantially similar from the 
perspective of the “intended audience.”41 Since the aim of copyright laws are to protect the 
                                                 
40
 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9
th
 Cir. 2004) (reversing the D.C. decision, holding that experts cannot testify to 
the significance of musical similarities). 
41
 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding the substantial similarity of the 
costume should be determined from perspective of the intended audience of young children); Data E. USA, Inc. v. 
Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 210 (9th Cir. 1988) (Holding that the trier of fact must determine  substantial similarity 
must between karate computer games through the eyes of a discerning 17.5 year old boy); Kohus v. Mariol, 328 
F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the intended audience test to determine substantial similarity between 
drawings of a latch for portable children's playyard); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding trier of fact must determine substantial similarity of computer programs through the 
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commercial value of the products, the Circuit Courts have held that determining copyright 
infringement from the “intended audience” perspective is imperative in certain instances.42 For 
instance, the “ordinary observer” may not find copyright infringement exists where an ordinary 
person in the “intended audience” would. Therefore, if the determination is not made from the 
perspective of the intended purchaser, products that will affect the intended market can enter the 
arena, disregarding the initial purpose of copyright laws fostering and protecting creativity. The 
“intended audience test” ensures that copyright infringement is properly found and that the 
commercial value of the original product is not unfairly diminished. 
43
 The Ninth Circuit has 
inconsistently applied the “intended audience test.”  In Mattel v. MGA Enmt’t the court plainly 
failed to apply the test.
44
 The Ninth Circuit’s version of the substantial similarity test has evolved 
throughout the years and now applies a version of the test that this paper has not yet discussed. 
To provide a better understanding of the courts failure to apply the “intended audience test” this 
paper will next outline the evolution of the substantial similarity test in the Ninth Circuit.   
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT  
The Ninth Circuit developed the two-part substantial similarity test in Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. The Krofft court held that after the objective-
extrinsic test reveals similarities in ideas, the court would then apply the second half of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
reaction of computer programmers, rather than laymen); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 
1222 (3d Cir. 1986)(Holding that in copyright cases involving exceptional audiences,  the court should determine 
substantial similarity from the viewpoint of the intended audience); Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 
982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992)(Holding that the trier of fact in determining  substantial similarity need not be 
limited by the strictures of its own lay perspective). 
42
 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) [hereinafter Ideal Toy Corp] (“The 
copyright laws protect not the reputation of the copyright holder, but the commercial value of his creation. Just as 
the relevant public in Arnstein v. Porter was held to be the ‘lay listeners for whom such popular music is composed,’ 
the relevant public here must include the children for whom the dolls are created.”).  
43
 Id. at 242.   
44
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010).  
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analysis, the intrinsic test.
45
 The Ninth Circuit explained that the two steps are separate and 
involve different analyses. The court held that the intrinsic test requires a pure subjective 
evaluation from the viewpoint of the reasonable observer, where expert evidence is not 
considered.
46
 However, within the extrinsic prong, the court objectively filters and dissects the 
protectable features from the unprotectable features of the work, so that the subjective prong can 
be applied and determine whether the two works are substantially similar.
47
  Thirteen years after 
Krofft, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated the extrinsic/intrinsic test in Shaw v. Lindheim.  
The Ninth Circuit changed the format of the analysis and held that the extrinsic prong 
would involve the “objective analysis of expression.”48 The restructure abandoned the prior test 
where examination of expression occurred exclusively under the subjective-intrinsic prong.
49
 
According to Shaw, rather than striving to compare the ideas of the two works, courts must list 
the elements of the works and determine whether there is any similarity in the expression of 
those elements.
50
 For example, if a court is determining the substantial similarity between two 
literary works the court would compare the elements plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, 
sequence of events, and characters.
51
 The Shaw court also affirmed that the intrinsic test is a 
“subjective analysis of expression.”52 However, the court acknowledged that the subjective 
analysis of expression is no more than the intuitive reaction of the lay observer, and as such is 
“virtually devoid of analysis.”53 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 1164.  
46
 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
47
  Id. at 1164.   
48
 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the substantial similarity test permits a 
finding of infringement only if a plaintiff proves both substantial similarity of general ideas under the “extrinsic test” 




 Id.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id.  
53
 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).  
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In Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the case that the Ninth Circuit relied on in 
Mattel v. MGA Entm’t, the court held that “the extrinsic test now objectively considers whether 
there are substantial similarities in both ideas and expression, whereas the intrinsic test continues 
to measure expression subjectively.”54 The Apple court applied the Shaw version of the 
substantial similarity test and recognized that substantial similarity is to be evaluated objectively 
and subjectively. However, the court in Apple went further and introduced another step to the 
copyright infringement analysis that that the Mattel court applied. The Ninth Circuit in Mattel 
explained that since others may freely copy a work's ideas and other unprotectable elements, the 
court must first determine the breadth of the possible expression of those ideas.
55
 The Mattel 
court continued to state that “if there's a wide range of expression (for example, there are 
gazillions of ways to make an aliens-attack movie), then copyright protection is ‘broad’ and a 
work will infringe if it's ‘substantially similar’ to the copyrighted work.”56 However, if there's 
only a narrow range of expression then copyright protection is “thin” and a work must be 
“virtually identical” to infringe.57 This analysis completely changes the substantial similarity test, 
and now requires the court to determine objectively in the extrinsic prong, and subjectively in the 
intrinsic prong whether the two works are “substantially similar” or “virtually identical” 
depending on the specific features “breadth of expression.”  
The Ninth Circuit in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t applied the “broad vs. thin analysis,” 
objective-extrinsic test, and subjective-intrinsic test in its analysis.  However, the court failed to 
                                                 
54
 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Apple] (citing 
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
55
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010) 
(citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994)).  
56
 Id. at 1442-43 (explaining that there are only so many ways to paint a red bouncy ball on blank canvas).  
57
 Id. at 1442-43 (citing Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir.2003)) (holding that a glass-in-glass jellyfish 
sculpture was only entitled to thin protection against virtually identical copying due to the narrow range of 
expression). 
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conduct the intrinsic test from the viewpoint of the Bratz and Barbie doll’s “intended 
audience.”58 As mentioned above the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Federal Circuits have held 
that the “intended audience test” is appropriate in circumstances where the “ordinary observer” is 
not the audience that is purchasing the item, and would not adequately protect the commercial 
value of the product. For instance, an adult may find that two dolls are dissimilar in their make, 
model, coloring or “overall look,” but, from the perspective of a child the items may appear so 
similar that the original items value would be significantly diminished if the defendants’ product 
were to enter the market.  The Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Federal Circuit have recognized 
that risk.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit improperly defined the substantial similarity test when the 
court held that the substantial similarity between the Bratz dolls and the sketches made by Carter 
Bryant should have been considered from the perspective of the “ordinary observer” instead of 
the “intended audience” of the dolls, children.  
IV.  THE “INTEDED AUDIENCE TEST” HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY THE SECOND, 
THIRD, FOURTH, SIXTH, AND NINTH FEDERAL CIRCUITS WHEN THE 
WORKS IN DISPUTE ARE INTENDED FOR SPECIALIZED AUDIENCES   
 
The second prong of the substantial similarity test requires the trier of fact to determine 
substantial similarity from the perspective of the “ordinary observer.” This prong has been 
interpreted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Federal Circuits to conduct the 
“ordinary observer” analysis from the perspective of the works “intended audience.”  Where the 
“intended audience” of the works at issue is more specialized or unique, than the “ordinary 
observer,” the determination of substantial similarity is more relevant from the perspective of the 
                                                 
58 Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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“intended audience.”59 Although, the “ordinary observer” might find the works at issue 
substantially similar, the intended purchaser of the works might not.  Therefore, without 
consideration of the works’ audience, the “substantial similarity test” is rendered meaningless. 
These determinations by the trier of fact have far reaching impacts on the competitive market 
and on creator’s rights. The purpose of copyright law is to protect a creator's market; and unless 
the analysis of substantial similarity is conducted through the viewpoint of the “intended 
audience,” protection afforded would be inconsistent with the markets needs.60 
The Fourth Circuit established in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc. (“Dawson”) the 
application of the “intended audience test” holding, “if lay public fairly represents “intended 
audience,” then court should supply lay observer formulation of ordinary observer test; however, 
if “intended audience” is more narrow or has specialized expertise that lay people would lack, 
the court should focus on that more narrow audience.”61 The Fourth Circuit clarified in Dawson 
that the decision did not change the rule but clarified the application of the “ordinary observer 
test.”62 The court explained the change in the approach was driven by “the effect of the 
defendant's work on the plaintiff's market and the practical evil of having an unaided uninformed 
finder of fact deciding the crucial issue in a case.”63 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit in Dawson 
held that the District Court erred in not applying the “intended audience test” when determining 
                                                 
59
 See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Dawson]. William L. Dawson 
brought action against Gilbert M. Martin and Hinshaw Music, Inc. for copyright infringement of spiritual “Ezekiel 
Saw De Wheel.”  
60
 Id.  
61
 Id. at 736.  
62
 Id. at 737.   
63
 Id.  
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whether Dawson’s and the defendant’s spiritual musical arrangements were substantially similar 
from the perspective of choral directors.
64
  
In Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., (“Lyons”) the Fourth Circuit 
reaffirmed the application of the “intended audience test” when the court reversed the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment for the defendant, because the court failed to evaluate 
the works from a child's perspective.
65
 The Fourth Circuit stated that the determination of 
substantial similarity between the defendants “Duffy purple dinosaur costume and the plaintiff’s 
copyright on Barney should have been conducted from the perspective of a child.”66 The Lyons 
court explained that works made for children required the application of the “intended audience 
test” because children possessed “specialized expertise, relevant to the purchasing decision, that 
lay people would lack.”67 The court referred to testimony by an elementary school administrator 
in support of this determination.
68
 The elementary school administrator testified that because 
Barney exemplified the qualities that the rally intended to communicate, the school rented, and 
she wore, the Duffy costume for a school rally called “Character Counts.” 69 The administrator 
explained that when she “appeared without advance notice before 500 children in the Duffy 
costume, the children saw Barney and ‘just went wild.’”70 The administrator stated that the 
“children went crazy and they were just going, ‘Barney. Barney. Barney.’”71 As the Fourth 
Circuit held, this evidence of actual confusion among children demonstrates the need for 
                                                 
64
 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 1990) (“There is no reason for Dawson to submit 
recordings to persuade a lay listener that the arrangements are substantially similar if the lay listener's conclusion 
would not reflect the response of the choral directors who would purchase one arrangement over another on the 
basis of the arrangement's sheet music.”). 
65
 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802 (4th Cir. 2001). 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id.  
69
 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802 (4th Cir. 2001). 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id.   
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perceiving works intended for children from the perspective of children, when determining 
substantial similarity.
72
 The “ordinary observer” test is clearly inadequate, because when 
perceiving the Duffy costume from an adults standpoint the “ordinary observer” may not have 
seen Barney just a simple purple dinosaur costume, however, as the testimony indicates the 
children unquestionably saw Barney when the administrator entered the stage. Therefore, when 
the works at issue are intended for children, substantial similarity must be determined from the 
perspective of a child to protect the market that the alleged infringing product is about to enter; 
since their perspective is much more indicative of the products effect on the market. The Sixth 
Circuit further supports the Fourth Circuits application of the “intended audience test” when the 
works at issue are intended for specialized audiences.  
In Kohus v. Mariol (“Kohus”) the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court erred when 
the court failed to consider substantial similarity from the perspective of the “intended 
audience.”73 The court in Kohus explained that the inquiry in the second prong of the “substantial 
similarity test” should focus on the “intended audience,” which will ordinarily be the lay public; 
however, “where the audience for the work possesses specialized expertise that is relevant to the 
purchasing decision and lacking in the lay observer, the trier of fact should make the substantial 
similarity determination from the perspective of the ‘intended audience.’”74 In Kohus the circuit 
court found that the works at issue, drawings of latches for children’s portable play-yards, was a 
rare case “where the ‘intended audience’ is not the lay public: the drawings are technical 
and…interpretational guidance is needed for the lay viewer to imagine the structure and function 
of the device that the drawings depict; and the initial purchasers of the device would be trained 
                                                 
72
 Id.  
73
 Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 858 (6th Cir. 2003).  
74
 Id.at 857 (citing Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802 (4th Cir. 2001)).  
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engineers, capable of discerning technical niceties that the ordinary person would not detect, and 
likely to base their purchasing decision on such details.”75 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit explained 
that where the target audience possesses specialized expertise, it is appropriate to consider 
similarity from the specialist's perspective although; the specialist's perception of similarity may 
be much different from the lay observer's.
76
 In support of the application of the “intended 
audience test” the circuit court explained that, “the ordinary observer test is based on the 
economic incentive view of copyright law, that the “purpose of the copyright laws [is to] 
provid[e] creators with a financial incentive to create for the ultimate benefit of the public.”77 
The most effective way to provide an incentive is to determine substantial similarity from the 
perspective of the purchasers, who may retain more specialized knowledge or a narrower 
viewpoint than the ordinary observer.78 Therefore, the “intended audience test” is most applicable 
when the works at issue are intended for a narrow audience, like engineers, children, or computer 
programmers. The Third Circuit agrees with the Sixth, and Fourth Circuits and has adopted the 
“intended audience test.”   
In Whelan Associates, Inc.  v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc. (“Whelan”) the Third Circuit held 
that the ordinary observer test is not useful and is potentially misleading when “the subjects of 
the copyright are complex, such as computer programs.”79 The Third Circuit held that Jaslow 
Dental Lab, Inc. infringed on Whelan Associates, Inc. copyright when the Jaslow Dental Lab, 
Inc. developed and sold copies of a substantially similar dental record keeping computer program 
                                                 
75
 Id. at 858.   
76
 Id. at 857.  
77
 Id. at 856 (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.1990).  
78 Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003). 
79
 Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Whelan].  
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Whelan Associates, Inc. had custom-made for the Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc.
 80
  Affirming the 
District Court’s award of damages and injunction against Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc., the Third 
Circuit explained that District Court properly relied on expert testimony in its determination of 
the substantial similarity and finding of copyright infringement.
81
 The Third Circuit recognized 
that the “intended audience” of the works was highly skilled and equipped with computer 
knowledge, and that knowledge of computers was extremely significant in determining the 
substantial similarity of the programs.
82
 Therefore, the “reasonable observer” standard was not 
applicable.
83
  The court announced that the, “lay observer test” was inappropriate “when the 
objects in question are intended for a particular, identifiable audience.”84 The Whelan court 
declared, that the Third Circuit was now “joining the growing number of courts which do not 
apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult materials,” 
and instead determining substantial similarity from the perspective of the “intended audience.”85 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit in its application of the “intended audience 
test” when the works at issue are intended for a specialized audience.  
The Federal Circuit in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc. (“Atari Games”) 
applied the extrinsic- intrinsic analysis.
86
 The court held that when applying the intrinsic prong 
“in the context of computer programs, the “ordinary reasonable person” with the ability to 
                                                 
80
 Id. at 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) (developer of custom computer program for dental laboratory record keeping brought 
copyright infringement action against dental laboratory, for whose benefit program was developed, and related 
parties, as result of development of another program with similar purpose in another computer language and 
distribution of both programs.”). 
81
 Id. at 1232 (The district court heard expert testimony…we believe that the district court applied an appropriate 
standard.”). 
82
 Id.  
83
 Id.  
84
 Id. (citing Michael Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in 
Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S.Cal.L.Rev. 385 (1981) (criticizing lay observer standard when objects in 
question are intended for particular, identifiable audiences)).  
85
 Id. at 1233.  
86
 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)[hereinafter Atari Games].  
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intelligently respond to computer expression, is a computer programmer and the perspective 
from which the trier of fact should determine substantial similarity.
 87
 The Federal Circuit 
recognized that in cases where the product is intended for a specialized audience, the perspective 
from which the substantial similarity is determined must be from the viewpoint of the “intended 
audience.” Therefore, when determining the similarity between the two computer programs, the 
Atari Games court held the “ordinary reasonable” person is an individual with the ability to 
intelligently respond the computer expression, which is a quality that “a lay observer” lacks.88 
Aligning with the rationale of the Fourth, Third and Federal Circuits, the Second Circuit also 
applied the “intended audience test” in copyright infringement involving specialized audiences.  
In Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. the Second Circuit held that “in making its 
finding on substantial similarity with respect to computer programs, the trier of fact need not be 
limited by the strictures of its own lay perspective.”89 The court explained that in “reality 
computer programs are … impenetrable by lay observers-whether they be judges or juries-and, 
thus… fall outside the category of works contemplated by those who engineered the Arnstein v. 
Porter test.”90 The Second Circuit cited the District Court’s decision to demonstrate why the 
“intended audience test” was appropriate in place of the “ordinary observer” test: “in the context 
of computer programs, many of the familiar tests of similarity prove to be inadequate, for they 
                                                 
87
 Id. at 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th 
Cir. 1989)). Nintendo of America Inc. brought action against Atari Games Corp for copyright infringement of its 
10NES computer program by Atari Games Corp.’s Rabbit computer program. The Federal Circuit held that the 
district court correctly considered the intended audiences perspective and expert testimony when determining 
substantial similarity.  
88
 Id.  
89
 Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Computer Associates]. 
90
 See id. (alluding to the Arnstein test, which is the two-step substantial similarity analysis the Second Circuit 
adopted, requiring the trier of fact  to determine in the second step whether the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work 
to such an extent that the  “ordinary observer” would find unlawful appropriation).  
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were developed historically in the context of artistic and literary, rather than utilitarian, works.”91 
The Second Circuit held that the expert testimony was invaluable and appropriately considered 
by the trier of fact in the District Court to determine substantial similarity.
92
 The court asserted 
that the expert testimony by Dr. Davis' was instrumental in dismantling the intricacies of 
computer science so that the trier of fact could formulate and apply an appropriate rule of law.
93
  
Without the expert testimony, the trier of fact would not have been able to understand the 
complexity of the computer programs at issue or adequately determine substantial similarity.
94
  
The “ordinary reasonable person” does not have the knowledge that computer programmers have 
for the 10NES or the Rabbit computer programs, and the purpose of the substantial similarity test 
is to protect innovative creations and ideas from being stolen and used to create a similar 
product, which is then sent into the market to compete with the original.  Therefore, without 
determining the “substantial similarity” from the perspective of the consumers who have a basic 
comprehension of the works at issue, the purpose of the substantial similarity the test is lost, 
because where the “intended audience” consumer of the 10NES & Rabbit computer programs 
may see a substantial similarity, the ordinary observer may not.  It follows that “intended 
audience test” is the most effective method of measuring the economic loss if the defendant’s 
product is to enter the market. The Second Circuit further supported the application of the 
“intended audience test” in cases involving children as the “intended audience.”  
In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Limited (“Ideal Toy Corp.”) the Second Circuit held that 
the District Court properly applied the “intended audience test” when determining whether the 
                                                 
91
 Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Computer Associates Int'l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
92
 See id. (Second Circuit held that perspective of the “intended audience,” a computer programmer, was a properly 
and necessarily applied). 
93
 Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992).  
94
 See id.  
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defendant’s dolls, Randy and Mary Lou, were substantially similar to the plaintiff’s Tammy and 
Pepper dolls.
95
 The court in Ideal Toy Corp. explained that the “basic consumer appeal of the 
dolls is to youngsters,” and “in applying the test of the average lay observer, they are…indeed 
the ‘far-flung faithful audience.”96 The District Court found that the impression of the faces and 
general appearance of the dolls was directed at youngsters.
97
 “The television advertising 
campaign of plaintiff was directed toward acquainting these youngsters with Tammy and Pepper, 
its new teenage and pre-teen dolls.”98 Therefore, District Court held, determining substantial 
similarity from a child’s perspective provides the most accurate market affect of the defendant’s 
work.
99
 Rejecting the defendant’s concession that the Mary Lou and Randy dolls were slavish 
copies of the Tammy and Pepper dolls, the District Court held that the crude workmanship did 
not hinder the affect of copyright infringement and that the body structures, size, and the features 
of the respective authentic and copied dolls were virtually identical.
100
 The Ideal Toy Corp. court 
found that the slight differences, such as the neck construction, which were observable only upon 
a close and fine inspection, did not detract from their substantial similarity, particularly since the 
targeted audience was children.
101
 The District Court announced, “it is the youngsters who, on 
the basis of this impression, go to the stores with their parents and purchase the dolls.” “In their 
enthusiasm to acquire Tammy or Pepper the children are not bent upon minute disparities, such 
as the curve of a neck, to detract them from accepting a doll whose outward ordinary appearance 
                                                 
95
 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. (Inc.), 360 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The district court correctly 
employed the ordinary observer test and, on the basis of the evidence before it, we cannot say that the denial of 
appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction as to the infringement claim constituted an abuse of discretion.”).  
96
 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  
97
 See id.  
98 
Id. at 242. 
99
 Id.  
100
 Id.   
101
 Id. 
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is virtually identical.”102 Therefore, the Southern District Court of New York and Second Circuit 
have held that the “intended audience test” should be applied when works at issue are intended 
for children.
103
 The Ninth Circuit has followed the Fourth, Second, Third, Sixth and Federal 
Circuits in applying the “intended audience test” in copyright infringement cases were the 
products at issue are intended for a specialized audience like children.  
The Ninth Circuit has routinely applied the “intended audience test” in cases where the 
products at issue were intended for children. In the landmark case of Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
finding that McDonald’s Corp. infringed on the Krofft’s copyright of the H.R. Pufnstuf series 
when the corporation hired Krofft’s former employees, and used the voice expert who supplied 
the voices of Pufnstuf, for its campaign and commercial advertising of McDonaldland.
104
 Sid and 
Marty Krofft were the creators of the H. R. Pufnstuf television series, which included several 
fanciful costumed characters and boy named Jimmy, who lived in a fantasyland called “Living 
Island,” inhabited by moving trees and talking books. The Ninth Circuit stated that to determine 
whether the defendant infringed on Kroffts copyright of the H.R. Pufnstuf the court must decide,  
whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the 
(eyes and) ears of lay (persons), who comprise the audience for whom such 
popular (works are) composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something 
which belongs to the plaintiff. Surely, then, we have an issue of fact which a jury 
is peculiarly fitted to determine.
105
 
Based on the citation above, it is evident the Ninth Circuit quantifies substantial similarity from 
the perspective of children when the works at issue are intended for children. The Ninth Circuit 
referred to the Second Circuit’s decision in Ideal Toy Corp. to support its application of the 
                                                 
102
  Id.  
103
 See id. 
104
 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977).  
105
 Id. at 1165 (9th Cir. 1977)(citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472 (2d Cir. 1946).  
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“intended audience test,” asserting that because the works at issue were intended for children, the 
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of young people should be 
standard of review.
106
 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the differences in 
the dress, mannerisms, colors and features of each character prevented a finding of substantial 
similarity, holding that the ordinary reasonable child “would not even notice that Pufnstuf is 
wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is wearing a diplomat's sash.” 107  The Ninth 
Circuits, substantial similarity analysis from the perspective of children in the landmark case of 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., demonstrates the circuits 
longstanding dedication to the “intended audience test.” The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its finding 
tha the “intended audience test” is applied in cases where the products at issue are intended for 
children in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. 
 The Ninth Circuit in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. (“Allioti”) affirmed the District Courts 
grant of summary judgment for the defendants holding that R. Dankin & Co. did not infringe on 
Aliotti’s copyright of the “Ding-A-Saurs” line of stuffed toy dinosaurs, with the manufacture of 
its stuffed toy line called “Prehistoric Pets.”108  The Ninth Circuits determination of substantial 
similarity was conducted from the perspective of children.
109
 The Allioti court held that “because 
children are the intended market for the dolls, … the court must filter the intrinsic inquiry 
through the perception of children.”110 The Ninth Circuit recognized that since the dispute was 
over the substantial similarity between stuffed dinosaurs intended for children, the court must 
                                                 
106
 Id. at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)(citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 261 F.Supp. 238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y.1966), aff'd, 
360 F.2d 1021 (2 Cir. 1966)).  
107
 Id. at 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the defendants works captured the “total concept and feel of the H.R. 
Pufstuf show” and Sid and Mary Kroffts copyright). 
108
 Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 
109
 Id.  
110
 Id. at 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing see Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166-67; Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 261 F.Supp. 
238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y.1966), aff'd, 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1966)). 
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disregard certain factors that may normally be considered in the determination of substantial 
similarity.
111
 “Substantial similarity of expression cannot be established by the fact that both 
lines of dinosaurs are gentle and cuddly, given that stuffed animals are intended for children and 
are usually designed to be soft and non-threatening.”112 The Allioti court found, there was no 
copyright infringement and that the grant of summary judgment was appropriate because upon 
de novo review the plaintiffs could find no similarity in expression “resulting from either the 
physiognomy of dinosaurs or from the nature of stuffed animals.” 113 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
held that no substantial similarity of protectable expression existed, as reasonable observer 
would not infer that defendant manufacturer's dolls captured total concept and feel of 
copyrighted designs, as perceived by children.
114
  
The Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized the importance of the “intended audience 
test” in copyright infringement cases where the works at issue are intended for children.115 
However, in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t the Ninth Circuit failed to determine the substantial 
similarity between the Carter Bryant’s sketches and the Bratz doll collection from a child’s 
perspective.
116
  As demonstrated above, the Ninth Circuit recognizes the importance and 
determinative impact of deciding substantial similarity from the perspective of the “intended 
audience” when there is an identified audience for the products at issue. Therefore, it must be 
found that the Ninth Circuit improperly defined the intrinsic analysis in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t 
when the court failed to announce substantial similarity should be determined from the 
perspective of the products “intended audience,” children.  
                                                 
111
 Id. at 901 (9th Cir. 1987).  
112
 Id.  
113
 Id.  
114
 Id.  
115
 Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 210 (9th Cir. 1988) (karate computer games compared through the 
eyes of “a discerning 17.5 year old boy”) 
116
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010).  
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V.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT IMPROPERLY DEFINED THE “SUBSTANTIAL 
SIMILARITY” TEST IN MATTEL V. MGA ENTM’T WHEN THE COURT HELD 
THAT SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY SHOULD BE DETERMINED FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE “ORDINARY OBSERVER” AND NOT A CHILD, 
FAILING TO INCLUDE WITHIN THE “INTRINSIC ANALYSIS” THE 
“INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST”  
 The Ninth Circuit in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t applied the “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” test to 
determine the substantial similarity between the Bryant’s sketches and MGA’s Bratz dolls.117 
After separating out the unprotectable features of Bryant’s sketches the Ninth Circuit explained 
that the District Court properly awarded broad copyright protection to the sketches since, “there 
is a wide range of expression for complete young, hip female fashion dolls with exaggerated 
features.
118
 The Ninth Circuit found that because designers may vary the face paint, hair color, 
hair-style, clothing, accessories and alter the sculpt of the dolls, there is a broad range of 
expression for complete female fashion dolls.
119
 Therefore, the assignment of broad copyright 
protection was appropriate.
120
 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the District Court erred 
when it assigned broad copyright protection to Bryant’s preliminary sculpt.121  The court found 
that dolls depicting young, fashion-forward females require idealized proportions-which means 
slightly larger heads, eyes and lips; slightly smaller noses and waists; and slightly longer limbs 
than those that appear routinely in nature.
122
 Since, these features can be can be exaggerated to a 
limited extent; “Make the head too large or the waist too small and the doll becomes freakish, not 
idealized,” the Ninth Circuit found only a narrow range of expression is available for doll sculpts 
                                                 
117
 Id. at 913.  
118
 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 
2010)(Finding that although sculpts are typically awarded thin copyright protection because there is a limited 
number of ways to depict over-sized features, the court held, overall there is a wide range of choices for complete, 
young, hip fashion dolls to be expressed). 
119
 Id. (Requiring Mattel to show that the Bratz dolls are substantially similar to Bryant's sketches disregarding 
similarities in unprotectable ideas to justify a copyright injunction). 
120




 Id.  




 Thus, the Mattel court found that thin copyright protection 
was the appropriate standard.
124
 Next, the Ninth Circuit examined the substantial similarity 
between Bryant’s sketches and MGA’s manifestation of those sketches in the Bratz doll 
collection.
125
 The Court announced that for the trier of fact to find that MGA infringed on 
Mattel’s copyright of Bryant’s sketches, the trier of fact must find the “ordinary observer” would 
find the sketches and Bratz dolls substantially similar.
126
  
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding that the entire Bratz doll 
collection was substantially similar to Bryant’s sketches.127 The court explained that the Bratz 
dolls could not be considered substantially similar to Bryant's preliminary sketches simply 
because the dolls and sketches depict young, stylish girls with big heads and an attitude since the 
collections later generations did not reflect the fashions and hairstyles in those drawings.
128
 The 
Mattel court then continued to explain that copyright protection is only afforded to the 
expressions of ideas, and not ideas themselves, therefore, the District Court’s rationale that the 
depiction of young fashion- forward females with the same oversized features constituted 
                                                 
123
 Id.  
124
 Id. (requiring Mattel will have to show that the Bratz sculpts are virtually identical to Bryant's preliminary sculpt 




 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 917 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 
2010)(Citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994)) (declaring that the 
standard for infringement-substantially similar or virtually identical-determined at the “extrinsic” stage is applied at 
the “intrinsic” stage, where the trier of fact determines whether an ordinary reasonable observer would consider the 
copyrighted and challenged works substantially similar (or virtually identical)).   
127
 Id. (reversing the District Court’s injunction and constructive trust prohibiting MGA from producing or 
marketing virtually every Bratz female fashion doll, as well as any future dolls substantially similar to Mattel's 
copyrighted Bratz works. The injunction covered not just the original four dolls, but also subsequent generations 
(e.g., “Bratz Slumber Party Sasha” and “Bratz Girlfriendz Nite Out Cloe”) and other doll characters (e.g., “Bratz 
Play Sportz Lilee” and “Bratz Twins Phoebe and Roxxi”)). 
128
 Id. (reversing the District Court’s finding that the Bratz doll collection was substantially similar, finding “that it 
might have been reasonable to hold that some of the Bratz dolls were substantially similar to Bryant's sketches, 
especially those in the first generation. But we fail to see how the district court could have found the vast majority of 
Bratz dolls, such as “Bratz Funk ‘N’ Glow Jade” or “Bratz Wild Wild West Fianna,” substantially similar-even 
though their fashions and hair styles are nothing like anything Bryant drew-unless it was relying on similarities in 
ideas.”).  
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substantial similarity was improper.
129
 The Ninth Circuit referenced it’s decisions in Aliotti v. R. 
Dakin & Co. and Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. to explain how the works at issue might share 
an idea, and be similar in the “layman’s” sense of the term, however that is not the sort of 
similarity the trier of fact looks for to determine copyright infringement.
130
 To support this 
contention the Ninth Circuit specifically quoted a section of its decision in Aliotti where the court 
held the trier of fact should not consider the stuffed and cuddly nature of the toys in determining 
substantial similarity.
131
 However, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on these cases, and that particular 
section of the decision is misplaced since the Aliotti court’s reasoning was founded in the 
rationale that the determination of substantial similarity was from the perspective of the toys 
“intended audience,” children.  
 In Allioti v. v. R. Dakin & Co the Ninth Circuit required the trier of fact to ignore the 
stuffed and cuddly nature of the works at issue because their “intended audience” was children, 
therefore, those aspects of the works are common in that industry and should not be considered 
when determining substantial similarity.
132
 The Allioti Court found that to include those 
characteristics in the consideration of substantial similarity would be unfair in ensuring a creative 
but competitive market. The Mattel courts reliance on this case in supporting its contention was 
improper and odd since it diverged from the substantial similarity test employed in Allioti.
133
 
However, the Ninth Circuits citation to Allioti and Data East reveals the Mattel court’s intention 
                                                 
129
 Id. (holding that the consistency of the particularized expression of the dolls' heads, lips, eyes, eyebrows, eye 
features, noses, as well as the particularized expression of certain anatomical features relative to others ... and de-
emphasis of certain anatomical features demonstrated is not enough to constitute substantial similarity).  
130
 Id. at 917.  
131
 Id. at 917 (9th Cir. 2010), amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 21, 2010) (citing Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 
898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987)(“Substantial similarity of expression cannot be established by the fact that both lines of 
dinosaurs are gentle and cuddly, given that stuffed animals are intended for children and are usually designed to be 
soft and nonthreatening.”).   
132
 Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987).   
133
 Mattel, supra note 123, at 917 (applying the extrinsic/ intrinsic test developed by the Apple Computer Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp.).  
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to defer or rely on cases involving products intended for children when the case in dispute 
involves works intended for children. Therefore, since the Mattel court did cite two cases 
involving products intended for children, and both the cases cited applied the “intended audience 
test,” the Ninth Circuit should have held that in the “intrinsic analysis” the trier of fact should 
determine substantial similarity from the perspective of a child and not the “ordinary reasonable 
observer.”  
 The Second Circuit in Ideal Toy Corp., held that the District Court properly applied the 
substantial similarity when the court determined substantial similarity from the perspective of a 
child, holding that, it is the youngsters who go to the stores with their parents and purchase the 
dolls and in their enthusiasm, children will not be detracted from purchasing by minute 
disparities of a doll whose outward ordinary appearance is virtually identical.
134
 Therefore, the 
Second Circuit held the “intended audience test” is most appropriate when the works at issue are 
intended for children.
135
 When the “intended audience” is children, certain considerations must 
be made that adults would not take into account. For instance, adults who collect dolls would 
most likely be more meticulous in discerning which dolls they want since it can be assumed their 
reasons for purchasing the items different than children’s intended use. For instance, adults 
collect dolls, whereas children play with them. Therefore, a difference in the curve of the neck, 
like in Ideal Toy Corp., would be more of a deterrent for an adult purchasing a toy, than for a 
child. These considerations are especially significant in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t since the works at 
issue are sketches and dolls. Determining the similarity of the works at issue from the 
perspective of a child alters the landscape of the factors considered. The sketches of the Bratz 
dolls were made to design a toy for children and the complete Bratz dolls were sold to children. 
                                                 
134
 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  
135
 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit held that on remand the trier of fact must determine whether the features of the 
sculpt are “virtually identical “ and whether the complete Bratz doll collection is substantially 
similar to Bryant’s sketches from the perspective of a child. If the trier of fact had determined 
Mattel was entitled to the copyright, the trier of fact would have necessarily conducted the 
substantial similarity test. Failure to apply the “intended audience test” may have improperly 
found that the dolls were infringing on Mattel’s copyright and prevented the copyright law from 
attaining its aim, which is to foster creativity while maintaining a competitive market place. The 
substantial similarity test would have been extremely important in determining the substantial 
similarity in the sculpt of the dolls. Like in Ideal Toy Corp., the trier of fact must have 
determined whether a child would have found the sculpt of the doll was “virtually identical.”136 
If the trier of fact had determined whether the sculpt was “virtually identical” from the 
“perspective of the ordinary observer” the decision may come out a different way, not taking into 
account the actual affect the infusion of these dolls will have on the children’s doll market. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have held in Mattel v. MGA Entm’t that substantial similarity 
be determined from the perspective of a child.  
The perspective of an adult and child are different, and applying the “ordinary observer” 
test does not account for how children will perceive the product. In Lyons v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 
the Fourth Circuit held that children possess “specialized expertise, relevant to the purchasing 
decision, that lay people would lack.”137 The school administrator’s testimony “children went 
crazy shouting, ‘Barney. Barney. Barney.” assuming she was Barney when she dressed in a 
purple dinosaur suit demonstrated the actual confusion among children and need for determining 
substantial similarity for works intended for children from the perspective of children. As the 




 Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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case law in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Federal Circuit Courts show, the “ordinary 
observer test” is an inadequate perspective for determining substantial similarity when the works 
at issue are intended for children. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the “the total 
concept and feel of the works” test, which the Ninth Circuit has applied in the majority of it’s 
cases prior to the Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. test.
138
 As discussed in section “II” the 
Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic analysis place relies on the trier of fact’s determination of 
whether copyright infringement occurred. Therefore it is imperative that the scope of the 
decision-making is narrowed so that the decision accurately reflects the actual affect of the 
defendant’s product on the market. The “intended audience test” achieves this goal, especially 
when the works at issue are intended for children. Not only are children’s perspectives much 
different than those of adults, but their market heavily relies on the appearance of the works. 
Functionality is sometimes important for children’s works, but particularly with dolls, like in 
Mattel v. MGA Etnm’t, appearance is crucial.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have directed 
the District Court to instruct the trier of fact that copyright infringement could only be found if a 
child would find Bryant’s sketches and the Bratz sculpts “virtually identical” in their “total 
concept and feel” or only if a child would find Bryant’s sketches and the complete Bratz dolls 
substantially similar in their “total concept and feel.” Nevertheless, no matter what new test the 
Ninth Circuit applies to find copyright infringement, the court must always determine substantial 
similarity from the perspective of child when the works at issue are intended for children.  
                                                 
138
 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp (holding that the defendants works captured the “total concept and feel of the H.R. Pufstuf show” 
and Sid and Mary Kroffts copyright); ); Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir.2002). 




 To maintain a creative and competitive market for children’s toys, copyright infringement 
should always be determined from the perspective of a child when the works at issue are 
intended for children. The Ninth Circuit improperly defined the intrinsic/ extrinsic test when the 
court failed to include the “intended audience test” within the intrinsic analysis. Determining 
copyright infringement from the perspective of the “intended audience” ensures that the affect of 
the defendant’s product on the market it enters is appropriately analyzed. Not accounting for the 
perspective of the potential purchasers contravenes the aim of copyright law, which is to foster 
creativity while still allowing for a competitive market. This is particularly true in the market of 
children’s toys since as case law shows, children are a driving force in the market place and are 
the audience many industries target. Their reactions to products are different than those of 
“ordinary observer.” Therefore, to protect the aim of copyright law and the accuracy of the 
“substantial similarity” test the Ninth Circuit must apply the “intended audience test,” when the 
works at issue are intended for children, and should have held in the Mattel v. MGA Entm’t 
decision that the intrinsic analysis be conducted from the perspective of a child, the Bratz dolls’ 
“intended audience.”  
 
 
 
 
